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Behind the veil of good intentions: Power analysis of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime 
 
Jan Ruzicka, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth 
 
 
Advocates and critics of nuclear weapons obviously differ in their 
views about the desirability of nuclear abolition. However, they largely 
share the conviction that the spread of nuclear weapons ought to be 
prevented. Dissenting voices are rare (Waltz 1981; 2012). They 
represent the exception, which effectively confirms the prevailing norm 
of non-proliferation (Gavin 2012). The acceptance of the need to stem 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons is even more prevalent among 
policy practitioners. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the 
advocacy of nuclear proliferation, real or imagined, has been reserved 
only for the special kind of pariahs, the likes of Iraq’s Saddam 
Hussein, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, or North Korea’s Kim Jong-un.  
 
The nuclear non-proliferation regime, as with a number of other 
regimes covered in this volume, is primarily driven by the twin 
objectives to prohibit and prevent. While there is practically universal 
agreement as far as prevention is concerned, the same cannot be said 
of prohibition. The cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), actually 
allows for legitimate, if in theory not infinite, ownership of nuclear 
weapons. The inequality among the signatories which it formalizes did 
not come into existence with the treaty itself. The NPT merely reflected 
the underlying power dynamics and realities at the time when it was 
drafted and entered into force. The countries which it recognizes as 
nuclear weapon states had developed and tested the bomb well before 
the treaty. In other words, the gap in the material capabilities between 
the states with the bomb and those without it existed irrespective of 
the international agreement central to this specific regime. What the 
treaty did bring about, in terms of power, was to confer a special 
status upon the already materially preponderant states. This readily 
apparent and frequently derided inequality has been a source of 
international tension ever since. Yet, it would be rather naïve and 
unsatisfactory to conclude that this is the only or even the 
predominant way in which power operates in the non-proliferation 
regime. Far more is at stake and the flows of power are not always 
running in the direction that might be expected if only material factors 
were taken into account.  
 
This article examines the variety of operations of power within the 
non-proliferation regime. It does so in order to better understand what 
makes the regime work and how. It also seeks to provide a critical 
analysis of how such operations of power influence the prospects of 
achieving the regime’s two fundamental goals – nuclear non-
proliferation and abolition. The article takes its lead from Susan 
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Strange’s piercing critique of the concept “regime” and of its use in the 
study of international relations. More than three decades ago, just as 
the regime analysis was firmly entrenching itself within the field, 
Strange argued that one of the main problems with this concept is the 
way in which it ‘distort[s] reality implying an exaggerated measure of 
predictability and order in the system’ (1982, p. 487). Instead of the 
surface of agreements, she implored, scholars should look at the 
numerous and dynamic bargains on which regimes are based. Such 
bargains reflect the operations of power inherent to the given issue 
area. Following Strange’s suggestion, this article uses the central 
research question informing this volume – how does power operate in 
international regimes? – to examine various bargains underpinning 
the efforts to combat the spread of nuclear weapons, control fissile 
materials, and limit the movement of nuclear technology that can 
potentially be deployed for military uses.  
 
From the perspective outlined by Strange, the bargains that need to 
be examined in the nuclear non-proliferation regime are not of the 
kind typically invoked by the proponents of the non-proliferation 
regime. In their rendition, the “grand bargain” of the NPT was struck 
between the nuclear “haves” and the nuclear “have-nots” (Weiss 2003; 
Daley 2010). While this can be interpreted with various degrees of 
nuance, the conventional understanding of the grand bargain 
ultimately boils down to the proposition that the non-nuclear weapon 
states gave up the possibility of possessing nuclear arms in exchange 
for civil nuclear assistance and the promise by the nuclear weapon 
states that they would engage in negotiations leading towards nuclear 
disarmament. I term this bargain, to the extent that it has now 
become firmly entrenched in the standard accounts of and 
discussions about the future of the NPT, the veil of good intentions. It 
gives the impression that the central building bloc of the non-
proliferation regime was a trade-off between two ostensibly 
unobjectionable objectives: stopping the spread of nuclear weapons on 
the one hand and the achievement of nuclear disarmament on the 
other. The standard notion of the grand bargain does admit that some 
power disparity was involved in the making of the NPT, but it was 
eventually settled and the main issue which remains to be solved is 
for all the parties to live up to their end of what was initially 
negotiated. Such a view is not only historically static, because it 
reduces the treaty and the regime as a whole to a mere problem of 
implementation of what was once agreed, but it also leaves power in 
its various forms and operations out of analysis. It is based 
exclusively on the notion of power whereby an actor can force another 
actor to do something they would otherwise not do. 
 
Instead, the article argues, a power analysis of the non-proliferation 
regime should look behind the veil of good intentions. For as Michael 
Cox has pointed out, ‘an international relations that denies the notion 
of a past, or takes no interest in power, is hardly likely to come up 
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with any major discoveries’ (Cox 2016, p. lxxiv). The article therefore 
aims to capture different bargains in which various forms of power 
delineated by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005) operate. 
The following bargains need to be analysed to grasp the operations of 
power in the non-proliferation regime. First, the U.S.-Soviet bargain 
which gave rise to the non-proliferation regime and the American 
power preponderance that has maintained it since the end of the Cold 
War (structural power); second, diplomacy and the use of force aimed 
at restricting or preventing access to nuclear materials and technology 
(compulsory power); third, bargaining venues contesting the aims of 
the non-proliferation regime and its technical maintenance 
(institutional power); and fourth, the creation of a particular 
hierarchies of states, ideas about the world order and the role of 
nuclear weapons in it (productive power). 
 
The article focuses on the nuclear non-proliferation regime broadly 
conceived. It encompasses more than merely the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and includes also efforts to ban or regulate nuclear weapons 
testing (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty); fissile material production 
(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty); regional presence of nuclear weapons 
(nuclear weapons-free zones); and civil nuclear cooperation (the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group). The broad understanding of the non-
proliferation regime allows for capturing the different forms of power 
and their operation across the spectrum of bargains ostensibly 
designed to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The article 
argues that from such a perspective a common denominator of how 
power operates within the non-proliferation regime can be discerned. 
It is, namely, a struggle to maintain or undermine the unequal 
distribution of material capabilities and the ensuing standing that 
both lie at the heart of the non-proliferation regime. The different 
operations of power are resources on which the competing actors can 
draw when trying to achieve their respective goals.  
 
 
The non-proliferation regime and structural power 
 
Two historical arrangements of structural distribution of power within 
the international system have been crucial for the formation and 
maintenance of the non-proliferation regime. First, it is a product of 
the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union to the position of 
superpowers during the Cold War. Second, the unprecedented 
structural predominance, which the United States has enjoyed since 
the end of the Cold War, has ensured not only the regime’s continued 
existence but also its expansion after the Soviet Union’s demise.  
 
While few would deny the effects of these two structural arrangements 
on the regime, various accounts understate their importance in favour 
of explanations that stress the wider international context shaping the 
regime’s formation (Shaker 1980; Scharfstetter and Twigge 2004) and 
4 
 
contributing to its persistence (Simpson and Howlett 1994; Rauf and 
Johnson 1995). This view was best expressed by William Walker who, 
acknowledging the part played by the United States and the Soviet 
Union, also argued that the key moves leading to the formation of the 
non-proliferation regime in the 1960s and 1970s were based on the 
recognition of ‘the project’s intrinsic universalism’ (Walker 2007, p. 
436; see also Walker 2012, pp. 63-85). In other words, structural 
distribution of power was accompanied by shared norms and rules 
that established both restraint and legitimacy.  
 
Such a reading of the non-proliferation regime is appealing for two 
reasons. First, it downplays the effects of structural power on 
international order and opens up the space for rational and moral 
arguments that, in theory, all states can make in the face of the 
overwhelming material superiority enjoyed by the superpowers. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, it offers the grounds to believe 
that the regime is not dependent on a historically specific structural 
distribution of power. Unlike regimes that may have collapsed in the 
past, because the underlying balance of power had changed (e.g. the 
concert of Europe in the 19th century), the supposedly shared norms 
of restraint and legitimacy offer a possibility that the non-proliferation 
regime would continue to exist even if the structural distribution of 
power were to change. As argued by Hedley Bull, the key to avoiding 
the two pitfalls of nuclear annihilation and/or the rapid spread of 
nuclear weapons during the Cold War was the conscious cultivation of 
restraint and self-restraint among states (Bull 1977; Ruzicka 2017).   
 
Appealing though this reading may be, it was not shared by many of 
those who observed the key moves leading towards the establishment 
of the non-proliferation regime in the 1960s. Instead, they noted the 
decisive role played by the newly found understanding between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Their shared outlook paved the 
way to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) and eventually the NPT 
(1968). Commenting on the draft of the NPT just as the treaty was 
opened for signature, David Vital complained about ‘the incapacity of 
the minor Powers to induce the greater Powers to deal with a matter 
which is of overwhelming concern to us all’ (Vital 1968, p. 432). He 
also made it clear that rejecting the treaty was not an option because 
it carried ‘the full weight of Russian and American support’ (Vital 
1968, p. 419). A few years later Alva Myrdal, the Swedish politician 
and participant in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 
negotiations, decried the NPT as a ‘clever design’ functioning ‘as a seal 
on the superpowers’ hegemonic world policy’ (Myrdal 1976, p. 168).      
 
Recent historiography on the formation of the non-proliferation 
regime, which has benefitted from access to previously unavailable 
archival materials, further confirms these observations. It has shown 
how the superpowers first began to de facto enforce non-proliferation 
within their respective spheres of influence and simultaneously came 
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to realize that their unique global standing could be mutually 
reinforced by forging a wider non-proliferation regime (Gavin 2010). 
This understanding set the stage for the superpower collusion. By the 
1960s, especially in the United States, ‘non-proliferation advocates 
now insisted that proliferation anywhere in the world would severely 
endanger US strategic interests’ (Popp 2014, p. 198). Although not as 
openly expressed, the sentiment was much the same in the Soviet 
Union.        
 
Central to the superpowers’ nuclear collusion – Bruce Russett merely 
expressed the commonly held view when he wrote that ‘the 
nonproliferation arena has consistently marked the high point of 
Soviet-U.S. cooperation on arms control’ (Russett 1989, p. 189) - were 
concerns about the maintenance of the structural distribution of 
power. Following China’s successful nuclear test in 1964 (providing a 
potent cautionary tale for both superpowers), the key worry arose with 
regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, but it also encompassed 
regional powers with nuclear ambitions around the globe. The drive to 
uphold the status quo led to the situation where ‘by the mid-1960s, 
the goal of non-proliferation at times made the Soviets and Americans 
less ideological rivals than realistic partners in what often appeared to 
be a concert or condominium’ (Gavin 2010, p. 416). Eventually, their 
joint pressure led to West Germany signing and ratifying the NPT in 
1975. 
 
Even though the pressure applied by the superpowers was crucial in 
the making of the regime, the bipolarity of the Cold War gave a 
number of states room to manoeuvre by constructing a path between 
them (Craig and Ruzicka forthcoming). France and China, two of the 
five recognized nuclear powers under the NPT, chose to stay outside of 
the treaty, but did participate in other institutions of the non-
proliferation regime such as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). The same applied to several countries that either harboured 
nuclear ambitions or at least had the potential to build the bomb. This 
concerned eventual nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan or South 
Africa, but also states like Argentina or Brazil. A trait that this group 
of countries had in common was their relatively peripheral status to 
the Cold War. In other words, they did not have to deal with the 
superpowers’ demands in the same way as Germany, Italy, or Japan 
did. 
 
The change in the structural distribution of power following the Soviet 
Union’s collapse did not mean the end of the non-proliferation regime, 
even though such concerns were articulated (Roberts 1993; Simpson 
1994). On the contrary, the United States’ unprecedented supremacy 
made the regime truly global, because policy-makers in Washington, 
much like their predecessors in the 1960s, were fully aware that the 
spread of nuclear weapons posed the most significant challenge to 
their country’s unmatched position. The key features of the politics of 
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nuclear proliferation became quickly apparent in the early 1990s 
(Mutimer 1997, 1998). As Barry Schneider put it, ‘the near-miss in 
Desert Storm and the threat posed by North Korea have spurred U.S. 
leaders to set a higher priority on non-proliferation and counter-
proliferation policies.’ At the same time, ‘other nations have drawn 
another conclusion from the experience of the 1990-91 Gulf War: no 
nation should tangle with the United States with purely conventional 
forces (Schneider 1994, p. 227).  
 
By the time the delegates at the 1995 NPT Review Conference reached 
the decision to extend the treaty indefinitely, many of the Cold War 
holdout states had joined the treaty or, like Brazil, would do so shortly 
thereafter. In the era of American power preponderance, there was 
nowhere to hide, no course between the superpowers to chart unless a 
state was a nuclear power. Today, only four states (India, Israel, North 
Korea, and Pakistan) that have developed their own nuclear arsenals 
since the treaty has entered the force in 1970 can afford to stand 
outside the regime. Ironically, the first state to feel the brunt of the 
American power in the post-Cold War era, Iraq, did not heed the 
lesson articulated by Schneider and was ultimately subject to the first 
war launched with non-proliferation as a key justification for the U.S.-
led conquest of 2003.  
 
To sum up, structural power has played a key role in the 
establishment and maintenance of the non-proliferation regime. It is 
quite remarkable how the regime, which came into existence and took 
shape on the basis of what used to be criticized as the superpower 
collusion and which saw an unprecedented expansion and 
solidification with the onset of the U.S. primacy in the 1990s, has 
come to be deemed indispensable for global security. This is the case 
not only in the United States, but also, and perhaps even more so, 
among the vast majority of the NPT signatories that have agreed to 
accept a materially inferior position. The regime’s most ardent 
proponents are either not aware or tend to forget the power bargains 
that brought it about and which hardened it in the post-Cold War era.   
 
 
Compulsory power – deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and war 
 
The structural distribution of power could not, however, by itself 
create and sustain the regime. Compulsory power as the use of force, 
threatened or actual, has been the regime’s indispensable feature, 
because it has transmitted the latent potential of structural power 
(along with the norms and preferences accompanying it) into actual 
policy choices and behaviour. Compulsory power has taken three 
main forms, ranging from the relatively stable and non-violent (though 
certainly not benign in its potential results) deterrence, over the 
pressures of coercive diplomacy, to the outright military combat. Each 
of these forms of compulsory power has at one point or another, and 
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sometimes simultaneously, ensured that the regime’s dominant norm 
against the spread of nuclear weapons would be upheld.  
 
Realization that deterrence will play a crucial role in the nuclear age 
came early as both observers and practitioners quickly concluded that 
no defence against a nuclear attack was possible (Brodie 1946). An 
enemy could only be deterred from launching such an attack by the 
threat of an equivalent retaliation (Herz 1959; Freedman 1981, pp. 40-
44). The practice of deterrence has had a direct impact upon the 
formation and operation of the non-proliferation regime. It led to the 
build-up of the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals and the ensuing series 
of stand-offs, which culminated in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. 
Taking the world to the brink of nuclear annihilation made plain the 
instability that the spread of nuclear weapons could produce. In the 
words of William Walker, the crises ‘fostered the view in Washington, 
Moscow and other capitals that security and survival could henceforth 
only be achieved through greater practice and institutionalization of 
restraint’ (Walker 2012, p. 64). The non-proliferation regime, broadly 
conceived, provided elements of such restraint. 
 
Much as the superpowers came to recognize that they had to manage 
their encounters more carefully, the crises in their mutual 
relationship also alerted them particularly strongly to the dangers of 
the spread of nuclear weapons. If, as a result of deterrence-based 
policies, things could have gone horribly wrong in interactions 
involving merely two states which constantly kept an eye on each 
other, the growing number of nuclear actors would have vastly 
expanded the scope for miscalculation (Jervis 1989). Even more 
importantly, with China’s ascent among the nuclear-armed states, it 
became obvious that the logic of deterrence could be used against the 
superpowers themselves. In other words, the superpowers concluded 
that the stability of international order, no matter how confrontational 
their bilateral dealings may have been, required that the actual 
number of relationships based on nuclear deterrence be limited. This 
would both reduce the scope for nuclear crises and, crucially, preserve 
the structural distribution of power favouring the superpowers. 
 
Exercising compulsory power in the form of a constant threat to use 
nuclear weapons was a crucial element in the effort to stop nuclear 
proliferation. If the individual member states of the respective alliance 
blocs, with the exception of the United Kingdom and France in the 
NATO alliance, were not allowed to possess their own nuclear 
capacity, how was their security to be ensured in the nuclear world? 
The promise to defend one’s allies by the nuclear means, the so-called 
nuclear umbrella, provided reassurance they asked for in the face of a 
nuclear threat posed by the other side. This system of extended 
deterrence was the flip side of the superpowers’ enforcement of 
nuclear non-proliferation within their respective alliance blocs. 
Whether the promise would have been fulfilled or not, whether the 
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superpowers would have risked their own territory or not, was beside 
the point. The deployment of superpowers’ nuclear arsenals created 
the need for extended deterrence and simultaneously delivered it, thus 
helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It gave the 
superpower collusion yet another dimension. The existence of Russian 
nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union changed very 
little in this regard. NATO has continued to bill itself as a nuclear 
alliance.  
 
Compulsory power in the non-proliferation regime goes well beyond 
the use of extended nuclear deterrence, the extent of which ultimately 
rests on the reach of alliance commitments. What about those states 
which have no nuclear protector to rely upon? During the Cold War 
they were exposed to strong diplomatic pressure, such as when the 
United States tried to prevent Brazil from going ahead with its 1975 
civil nuclear deal with West Germany that was perceived to have a 
hidden military dimension (Lowrance 1976; Gray 2012). But the 
superpower competition did limit such pressures because of concerns 
about the overall balance of power. This was evident from the number 
of countries in the non-aligned movement actively pursuing nuclear 
weapons programs, with some of them (India, Pakistan) eventually 
doing so successfully.  
 
The use of coercive diplomacy grew rapidly with the onset of the 
American primacy in the 1990s. Increasingly, direct military action 
accompanied it. The first Gulf War concluded with the imposition of a 
robust inspection regime, forged within the United Nations Security 
Council, designed to dismantle Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure. 
Occasional use of air strikes backed the sanctions regime throughout 
the rest of the decade. When this regime of coercion appeared 
unsatisfactory, proliferation concerns provided a convenient rationale 
for the second Gulf War. Coercive diplomacy and the example of 
military intervention in Iraq also nudged Libya to negotiate the 
dismantlement of its rudimentary nuclear program in 2003.  
 
Direct use of force was on full display when the 2007 Israeli air strike 
destroyed a clandestine nuclear facility in Syria, which was under 
construction probably with North Korean technical and Iranian 
financial assistance. The United States was well aware of the Israeli 
mission and may have given tacit approval to it. Leonard Spector and 
Avner Cohen highlighted as notable ‘the near total lack of 
international comment or criticism of Israel’s action’ (Spector and 
Cohen 2008, p. 15). But truly remarkable was the fact that a state 
which remains outside of the NPT, and is often criticized for 
abstaining from this linchpin of the non-proliferation regime, used 
violence to enforce the non-proliferation norm and thus helped to prop 
up the wider regime. In doing so, it obviously disregarded various 
institutional channels, such as the IAEA or the UN Security Council, 
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that were open to it and the use of which it supported in relation to 
the Iranian nuclear programme.  
 
In the Iranian case, the full repertoire of coercive diplomacy came into 
play. The IAEA’s initial findings about Iran’s failure to report some of 
its nuclear activities were revealed in 2003. Subsequently, when the 
IAEA reported Iran to the UN Security Council, these discoveries led to 
several rounds of sanctions imposed by the Security Council. The 
United States and its allies further augmented the sanctions regime 
against Iran. These tools of coercive diplomacy were accompanied by 
repeated threats of the use of force, especially by the United States 
and Israel. While the dispute was eventually resolved through 
negotiations culminating in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (better known as the Iran nuclear deal), compulsory power, 
which put Iran under a considerable amount of pressure, was 
undoubtedly a crucial part of the diplomatic settlement. 
 
If part of the reason for the increased reliance upon compulsory power 
since the end of the Cold War has been the relative freedom to do so, 
the period has also shown the limits of such power. This was most 
apparent in the case of North Korea, but the other three states (India, 
Israel, Pakistan) remaining outside the NPT provide good illustrations 
as well. All three were able to hold on to their nuclear weapons 
programs because they made decisive progress (with varying degrees 
of assistance from the existing nuclear powers) during the Cold War. 
The 1998 India-Pakistan nuclear tests were mere culminations of long 
trajectories (Khan 2012; Perkovich 2001).  
 
North Korea, on the other hand, despite engaging in nuclear research 
for decades, only began to seriously develop its nuclear capability in 
the late 1980s (Pollack 2011). Throughout the 1990s, it managed to 
evade (mostly U.S.) pressure by relying on a combination of 
diplomacy, deceit and conventional deterrence. All of this came at a 
terrible cost to its own population, but from the point of view of the 
ruling regime reached a successful end with the construction of the 
bomb and its eventual testing in 2006. Despite subsequent efforts, 
coercive diplomacy has failed and the possession of a nuclear 
deterrent, if only in a rather basic form thus far, has made the 
prospect of the use of force against North Korea unlikely and certainly 
raised the threshold for doing so. It remains a question to what extent 
the failure to prevent North Korea from going nuclear was a by-
product of China’s desire to soft-balance against the United States 
(Pape 2005) and to what degree it was made possible by the flaws 
inherent to the institutions of the non-proliferation regime. What 
remains indisputable, is the fact that the increased reliance upon and 
the use of compulsory power in the maintenance of the non-
proliferation regime have driven up the price of resistance 




Institutional power – maintenance and contestation 
 
The non-proliferation regime consists of a number of different 
institutions. These have been crucial not only for its maintenance, 
because they provide for ‘implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge’ (Krasner 1983, p. 2) and venues where various forms of 
control can be exercised, but also for sites where contestation over the 
regime’s goals can take place. One indicator of how power operates 
within the non-proliferation regime is therefore the extent to which 
actors are able to shape and/or defy expectations, which characterize 
it at a given point in time. As Andrew Hurrell argued, ‘for powerful 
states the choice is often not between institutions and no institutions, 
but rather which institutions offer the best tradeoff between 
effectiveness on the one hand and the maximization of control and 
self-insulation on the other’ (Hurrell 2005). Creating, privileging, 
supressing or ignoring institutional settings plays a key part in the 
dual process of regime maintenance and contestation. This section 
examines operations of institutional power with regard to the aims of 
the non-proliferation regime and the technological requirements of its 
preservation. It shows how different institutions, both formal and 
informal, have come to prominence depending on the changing 
preferences of actors and their relative power. While these processes 
of institutional ebbs and flows tend to favour powerful states, they 
have also presented opportunities to absorb and contain some of the 
dissatisfaction on the part of weaker actors.  
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency has been a good example of 
the workings of institutional power in the non-proliferation regime. 
Founded in 1957 in response to the growing demands to share the 
promise of civil nuclear energy internationally, policy-makers in the 
United States agreed with those in the Soviet Union that the agency 
could usefully serve ‘as a means of controlling the operations of 
smaller powers’ (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, p. 74; see also 
Holloway 2016; Roehrlich 2016). The potential beneficiaries of civil 
nuclear assistance, including European countries assembled in 
Euratom, resisted robust safeguard provisions, but without 
safeguards there would have been no nuclear sharing. The ensuing 
result of the negotiations partly evaded the issue by pushing 
resolution of many of the precise details into the future. Slightly over a 
decade later, in 1968, the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
reaffirmed the IAEA’s role concerning the safeguards provisions and 
their monitoring. Crucially, Article III of the NPT stipulates the 
obligation of the non-nuclear weapon signatories ‘to accept 
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and 
concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency’ and 
mandates that they must negotiate such an agreement ‘to meet the 
requirements of this Article’. The nuclear weapon states are subject to 
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no such provision, because they have already mastered the 
technology, of course.  
 
Even though the IAEA’s task is to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology, it cannot enforce compliance. That role is reserved to the 
UN Security Council to which the IAEA’s Board of Governors can refer 
states that the organization finds to be in non-compliance with 
safeguards provisions. This enforcement mechanism was used, for 
instance, to introduce the UN sanctions against Iran in the 2006-16 
period. On the other hand, earlier in the century, when the IAEA 
findings did not fit with the preconceived notions of the George W. 
Bush administration about Iraq’s nuclear programme, the United 
States dismissed its conclusions and did not hesitate to sidestep the 
agency by going directly to the UN Security Council. These two 
instances are useful reminders of how the IAEA may serve the 
interests of powerful states, but also how they may choose to 
disregard it when expedient to do so.        
 
The United States and the Soviet Union initially enjoyed strong 
advantages in the provision of civil nuclear energy technology. This led 
to ‘hierarchical politico-military’ as well as ‘hierarchical politico-
industrial relationships’ (Walker 2012, p. 89). However, only the Soviet 
Union managed to maintain this position within its sphere of 
influence. The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974, facilitated by 
materials and technologies obtained from Canada and the United 
States that were under no international safeguards, showed fully the 
potential consequences of civil nuclear exports. When Albert 
Wohlstetter warned that the technology transfers would result in 
‘spreading the bomb without quite breaking the rules’ (Wohlstetter 
1976-7), he captured the worry that came to grip American policy-
makers.  
 
The reaction came in the form of various domestic and international 
restrictions on exports (Mutimer, 1998; Walker 2012, pp. 92-94). 
Building exclusive institutions such as the Zangger Committee or the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which brought together the potential 
suppliers, was central to this effort. These institutions have served 
formally and informally in the processes of controlling exports and 
ensuring that potential recipients of nuclear technology are 
signatories of the NPT, and thus covered by the IAEA monitoring of 
safeguards agreements. Nevertheless, the 2005 nuclear deal between 
the United States and India demonstrated that exceptions could be 
made, when the dominant state in the international system so wished. 
The United States convinced other members of the NSG to allow for 
nuclear exports to India despite its refusal to join the NPT. George 
Perkovich argued that the balance of power concerns, not the question 
of nuclear proliferation, were a key factor informing American 
decision-making: ‘The friendliness of India toward the United States 
was more important than its nuclear policy, period, especially insofar 
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as it could help constrain China’s future power’ (Perkovich 2010, p. 
23). In short, the deal, as well as the Obama administrations’ efforts 
to pave the way for India’s NSG membership, showed how tightening - 
as well as relaxing - nuclear exports could both be compatible with 
the pursuit of advantageous international position. The United States 
used institutional power with a view towards the structural 
distribution of power within the international system. 
 
The India deal exacerbated the cries about inequality that grew  
louder among the critics of the non-proliferation regime in the 1990s, 
reaching a fever pitch in the first decade of the 21st century (Walker 
2007). The increasing institutionalization of non-proliferation 
meetings as an endless process, itself part of the wider non-
proliferation complex (Craig and Ruzicka 2013), have played an 
important role in neutralizing much of this critique. Such meetings 
provide opportunities to vent spleen, rather than achieving much in 
terms of tangible results on either non-proliferation or disarmament. 
 
The expansion of institutional venues within the non-proliferation 
regime can be traced to the preparations for the 1995 Review 
Conference of the NPT, which was to decide on the treaty’s continued 
existence. However, it was in the wake of the indefinite extension of 
the NPT when they truly took off. The 1995 extension package 
included the so-called enhanced review process with annual 
preparatory meetings. It paved the ground for the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to enter force but has already 
spawned the CTBT Organization. It charted out the elusive goal of the 
Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone unsuccessfully pursued by 
diplomats ever since then. A Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty has 
proven to be similarly elusive. Symptomatically, the most ambitious 
recent efforts to change the global course on the existence of nuclear 
weapons, the Humanitarian Initiative and the ensuing nuclear ban 
negotiations, have been discussed within the UN-established Open-
Ended Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament. To expect ground-
breaking results from these institutions would defy past experience 
(see, for instance, outcomes of efforts by the Canberra Commission or 
the Global Zero), yet they continue to be valued, because they “keep 
the ball rolling” by sustaining ongoing discussions focused on nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament. They also allow state and non-
state actors to voice their frustrations with the nuclear weapon states, 
challenge perceived injustice, and maintain spaces for resistance. 
 
The release valve function of institutions within the non-proliferation 
regime has come at a steep price, however. As Campbell Craig and 
Jan Ruzicka (2013) have argued, the institutionalization of the 
nonproliferation complex has failed to move the world towards 
tangible solutions of the problem of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the 
nonproliferation complex has provided ready-made justifications for 
the use of force and other forms of compulsory power by the 
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predominant states. In the post-Cold War period, the condition of 
unipolarity has turned the institutions of the non-proliferation regime 
into a primary example of a great-power co-optation of an 
international regime (Craig and Ruzicka forthcoming). The range of 
institutions allows for voicing criticism and formulation of demands. 
However, the main outcome of their existence, the actual 
strengthening of the regime, has enabled great powers’ control over 
non-proliferation, much like the United States and the Soviet Union 
envisaged more than half a century ago. 
 
 
Productive power – hierarchies, orders, and the states system  
 
The most obvious manifestation of productive power within the non-
proliferation regime has been the creation and entrenchment of 
various hierarchies of states (“haves” and “have nots”; protectors and 
protected; responsible powers). Hand in hand with these hierarchies, 
has come the preservation of a specific world order and alongside it 
the states system. In the long run, these operations of power in the 
regime may prove to be the most lasting and have the most significant 
effects, because they help to constitute the world within which 
international politics takes place.  
 
By preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, the non-
proliferation regime has exacerbated the distinction that has arisen 
with the invention of the bomb. Nuclear weapons have ‘emphasised 
the hierarchical dimension of international society, creating a new 
category of “have” and “have not” states’ (Clark 1989, p. 192). 
Importantly, the regime did not cause this distinction, but it has 
endowed it with legitimacy by recognizing (in Article IX of the NPT) 
certain states as nuclear weapon states. Other states have since come 
to acquire nuclear weapons, but short of the highly unlikely revision 
of the NPT or drafting of a new international agreement, their 
possession will not receive the same recognition as that of the first five 
nuclear powers. The semantic distinction between the nuclear weapon 
states and the nuclear-armed states is the expression reinforcing the 
difference produced by the very existence of the non-proliferation 
norm. While all these states may be on an equal material footing when 
it comes to possessing nuclear weapons, they certainly are not in 
terms of their hierarchical ordering, which has further implications for 
their differentiated treatment (for instance by the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group) in the global order.  
 
The non-proliferation regime has also produced particular 
dependencies, such as when states rely upon extended nuclear 
deterrence. Arrangements like that ensure an elevated status for some 
states (the nuclear protectors) and subordination of others (the 
protected). They also increase the chance of continued existence of 
nuclear weapons. In addition to contributing to one’s own security, 
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nuclear possession can be further justified by pointing out obligations 
towards others who have come to depend on it. Whether the 
dependence is real or imposed hardly matters, because holding on to 
nuclear weapons becomes more than a selfish act. Protecting others 
endows the possession with the veneer of benevolence, making it less 
likely that nuclear disarmament could happen. If the nuclear 
protectors are to live up to their commitments, they have to retain 
nuclear ownership. Such reliance increases the value of nuclear 
possession since other countries rely on it, and that in turn drives up 
the dependence. During the Cold War, the cases of West Germany and 
Japan provided suitable illustrations. It was impossible to allow them 
to develop nuclear weapons (and in some corners that perspective 
continues to resonate to this day), but at the same time it was 
impossible not to not offer them the protection of extended deterrence. 
In the post-Cold War era, the case in point has been the repeated 
insistence by the members of the NATO alliance that it is a nuclear 
alliance. Reaffirmation of NATO’s nuclear status serves both to tie in 
the United States as the nuclear protector and to implicate its 
European allies, the protected, who cannot disown nuclear weapons 
(as their evasive approach to the Humanitarian Initiative and the 
nuclear ban proves fully). All this happens under the label of nuclear 
burden sharing.   
 
While the previous two hierarchies are clear-cut (a state either has or 
does not have nuclear weapons, it either provides or receives extended 
nuclear deterrence), the third type of hierarchy the non-proliferation 
regime has produced is more ambiguous. It concerns the notion of 
responsibility in relation to the nuclear ownership and comes in two 
forms. First, it can express the belief that the nuclear weapon states 
have a special responsibility to maintain international order (Bull 
1977; Bukovansky et al 2012). In the specific case of nuclear 
proliferation, they have acquired the privilege of a recognized 
ownership of the bomb, but have to wield it responsibly (Bull 1980). 
That means exercising the necessary self- and mutual restraint to 
avoid a nuclear war and preventing the spread of the bomb to 
additional countries. A problem obviously arises with those states, 
whose nuclear ownership has not been similarly recognized. The 
heated debates surrounding the preferential treatment India received 
from the Nuclear Suppliers Group encapsulated this problem very 
well. To justify the exemption from the existing rules, it had to be 
repeatedly emphasised that India has long acted as a responsible 
nuclear state. Nevertheless, these claims only pertained to the 
exemption, not India’s nuclear arsenal. Moreover, despite the denial to 
recognize the nuclear possession of states like India, there is still the 
expectation that they should act in ways that define responsible 
nuclear behaviour, but with none of the rights enjoyed by the 
recognized nuclear weapon states. To these nuclear powers, which 
have acquired the bomb for their own particular reasons, such notion 
of responsibility is not only unacceptable, but also absurd and 
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hypocritical. They simply reject the hierarchy of states underpinning 
it, even if it means they incur various costs for doing so.  
   
The second notion of responsibility is open to the much wider group of 
states that can prove their sense of responsibility by forsaking nuclear 
weapons or even the potential means of making them. It is based on 
the belief that a truly responsible action is to renounce nuclear 
weapons altogether. States, which gave up existing nuclear arsenals – 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, South African and Ukraine – are held up as role 
models worthy of emulation particularly by other nuclear-armed 
states, though not by the recognized nuclear weapon states. Next in 
the pecking order are those states, which once had the nuclear 
ambition, but never achieved it and came to embrace the non-
proliferation regime (for example Argentina and Brazil). The 
commitment to the regime is the real test of responsibility. Those 
states that did not fulfil their nuclear weapons desires but were seen 
as barely committed to or actually cheating on the regime (Iraq, Libya, 
Iran, for instance) have faced persistent doubts about their actions. 
Other states can demonstrate their sense of responsibly by 
participating in such institutions as Nuclear Security Summits and 
helping the nuclear weapon states to maintain the regime.  
 
The two notions of responsibility lead to a paradoxical outcome. In 
theory, all countries, even nuclear weapon states spending tens of 
billions dollars to upgrade their nuclear arsenals, can claim to be 
acting responsibly when it comes to nuclear weapons. This is so, 
because in practice their responsibilities are hierarchically 
differentiated. The differentiation is a product of what place a state 
has been able to assume or been assigned in relation to the non-
proliferation norm. It stems from and serves to maintain a specific 
world order. While in many cases this ordering has led to states 
forsaking the bomb, Itty Abraham has shown how dissatisfaction with 
one’s position has also shaped some countries’ decisions to go nuclear 
(Abraham 2009). Similarly, Shampa Biswas has argued the non-
proliferation regime ‘exists, not because it effectively solves the 
“problem of nuclear weapons,” but because it also helps to constitute 
a certain rendition of the problem of nuclear weapons that serves a 
global ordering function’ (Biswas 2014, p. 74). In short, the non-
proliferation norm is one of the most powerful norms underpinning 
the current global order, though not in the sense that many of its 
proponents, driven by good intentions to prevent nuclear annihilation, 
believe. 
 
Finally, besides entrenching a specific international order, non-
proliferation has been one of the key elements in preserving the states 
system, even though some, like Hedley Bull, have viewed the spread of 
nuclear weapons as a factor which has prevented the imposition of a 
world government by any single great power (Bull 1977, 263). By 
helping to slow down the spread of nuclear weapons, the non-
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proliferation regime has contributed to lowering the danger of actual 
physical destruction on a scale that would mean the de facto end of 
the interstate system. States have played a crucial role in shaping, 
maintaining, and enforcing the bargains and norms of the non-
proliferation regime. The regime has reinforced state control over the 
legitimate use of violence. As Bruce Russett wrote just as the Cold 
War was nearing its end, and the accompanying state disintegration 
was about to begin, allowing ‘nuclear proliferation into the hands of 
nonstate actors would erode the basis for state hegemony over 
national societies’ (Russett 1989, p. 190). This is precisely why, Serhii 
Plokhy has argued, the George Bush administration tried to 
desperately prevent the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Plokhy 
2015). While that attempt proved futile, the full recognition of 
sovereignty of the newly independent states (except for Russia), which 
inherited some of the Soviet nuclear weapons, was eventually 
predicated on renunciation of their nuclear possession. This 
repudiation of nuclear arsenals took place within the parameters of 
the non-proliferation regime. Living up to the non-proliferation norm 
produced the condition of existence within the states system, further 
strengthening both.  
 
 
Conclusion    
 
The core of Susan Strange’s critique of regime theory was that by   
focusing on principles, norms, rules and procedures it neglected the 
power bargains that underpin international regimes. In this, she 
echoed a broader point raised by Judith Shklar in her rejection of 
legalism in politics. Shklar stressed that ‘the essential mark of politics 
is power’ but ‘unless it is placed within a specific historical situation it 
is completely unimaginable’ (Shklar 1986, p. 125). This article is an 
attempt to understand the operations of power within the non-
proliferation regime in their various historical settings, so that they do 
not remain unimaginable.  
 
Paying attention to the dynamic bargains as they changed over time 
shows the workings of structural, compulsory, institutional and 
productive power. What connects them is the simultaneous struggle to 
preserve and do away with the unequal distribution of material 
capabilities and status recognition. The ability to wield the non-
proliferation norm, the chief product of the regime, defines the art of 
this contestation. Invoking this norm allows states to raise a range of 
demands, which are frequently contradictory. The success of the 
nuclear weapon states has stemmed from the creation of the belief 
that non-proliferation is the unquestionable good. It is the right thing 
to do. There are many good reasons, practical as well as moral, to 
support such a conclusion. Nevertheless, no matter what these 
reasons may be, the non-proliferation norm means non-acquisition, 
before it means disarmament. It is therefore important to realize that 
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the belief in non-proliferation functions as a veil of good intentions, 
obscuring assorted power bargains upholding the regime. So long as 
this continues to be the case, the nuclear weapon states will continue 
to have the upper hand. This is not due to their material 
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